

Short Notes on Communication with Byzantine Node Failures: Part I

Rachit Agarwal, Guanfeng Liang and Nitin Vaidya
 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Champaign, Illinois, USA
 Email: {agarwa16, gliang2, nhv}@illinois.edu

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In our previous work [1] and [2] we showed by example that linear network coding cannot achieve secure network capacity for error detection. To the best of our knowledge, it was the first work that identified the insufficiency of linear network codes in achieving secure capacity, even for unicast. Some recent works [3], [4] also discovered (independently) the necessity of non-linear network codes to achieve secure capacity.

I. COUNTER EXAMPLE FOR PREVIOUS CONJECTURE IN REFERENCE [2]

In our earlier work [2], we formulated the problem of computing the maximum throughput a network can achieve with duplication and forwarding, which is one particular type of linear network codes, as a linear optimization problem. To the end of the paper, we conjectured that only $N(s)$, the neighbors of the source, need to perform coding to achieve the maximum throughput with linear codes and single node failures:

Conjecture 1: The error-detection capacity of the network is achieved with all nodes in $V \setminus \{s, N(s)\}$ only forwarding a replica of the information packets.

It turns out that this conjecture is not true. The network in Fig.1 is a counter example. In this network, the source has infinite broadcast capacity, each of nodes in $N(s)$ has broadcast capacity 1, and each of the neighbors of the destination has capacity 2. Solving the optimization problem in [2] for this network will give the maximum error detection rate with duplication and forwarding equals to $3\frac{2}{3}$. But in fact, with linear network coding in the neighbors of the destination can achieve a rate of 4. A scheme to achieve rate of 4 is as follows:

s broadcast packet a, b, c, d , and $a + b + c + d$. r_1 to r_5 each forward one of the five packets from s . Then r_6 forwards a and b , r_7 forwards c and d , and r_8 will forward $a + b + c + d$. In addition, r_8 will also generate a new packet $a + c$ from packet a and c .

We can see that none of r_1 to r_5 can tamper the packets without being detected because they are protected by the (5, 4) code $(a, b, c, d, a + b + c + d)$. So the adversary




Fig. 1. Counter example for previous conjecture

can only attack r_6 to r_8 . If the adversary attacks r_6 , it cannot tamper packet a without being detected since it is protected by the (3, 2) code $(a, c, a + c)$. r_6 cannot tamper packet b without being detected either, since the destination can derive $b + d$ from $a + b + c + d$ and $a + c$ it receives from r_8 , and b is protected by the code $(b, d, b + d)$. Similarly, neither r_7 nor r_8 can tamper the packets they transmit without being detected.

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